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Stormy Regulation: The Problems that
Result when Stormwater (and Other)
Regulatory Programs Neglect to Account for
Limitations in Scientific and
Technical Information
Wendy E. Wagner*
On paper, the regulation of stormwater discharges in the
United States appears to be a massive and growing enterprise.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) website educating
the public and regulated parties about its extensive stormwater
requirements provides dozens of reports, including detailed engineering assessments, best practices options, fact sheets, and EPA
guidance documents, some of which are so enormous that they
are almost too large to download.1 Federal stormwater regulatory requirements involve two separate phases, multiple categories of regulated parties—each of which enjoys individualized
treatment—and menus of best management practices (BMPs) to
fit virtually any type of land use that creates polluted stormwater.2 The EPA is currently in the midst of promulgating a revised
“NPDES Stormwater Multi-Sector General Permit for Industrial
Activities” (MSGP),3 one of almost a dozen separate stormwater
permit programs.4 The stormwater regulatory program is so
substantial that private companies have formed to help regulated
parties navigate the requirements.5 State and local programs
only magnify the growing complexity. The State of California,
* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor, University of Texas School of Law. Please
direct comments to WWagner@law.utexas.edu. Many thanks to Xavier Swamikannu for
helpful comments on an earlier draft and to participants at the Chapman symposium and
the editors of the Chapman Law Review, particularly MacKenzie Batzer, for valuable
feedback and editorial assistance.
1
See EPA, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=6 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
2
See, e.g., EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM (June
1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf [hereinafter EPA, OVERVIEW
OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM].
3
EPA, NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES), PROPOSED
2006 MSGP, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/msgp2006_all-proposed.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006). [hereinafter EPA, 2006 MSGP].
4
See infra n.86 Figure 2.
5
See, e.g., StormwaterAuthority, http://www.stormwaterauthority.org (last visited Feb. 6,
2006).
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Riverside County, and other locales in California add still another layer of implementing requirements on top of the EPA’s
unwieldy regulatory base.6
The million dollar question, though, is whether all of these
regulations and guidance documents succeed in actually controlling this important source of water pollution. The federal Clean
Water Act stormwater permit program regulates only a subset of
all sources of stormwater runoff—those that occur at identified
facilities, municipalities, and large construction sites.7 But the
contribution of pollutants from these larger stormwater sources
appears to make up a significant portion of polluted runoff in urban watersheds.8 The effectiveness of the EPA’s stormwater
permit program is thus an important piece in the larger puzzle of
assessing the adequacy of current legal responses to the problem
of urban runoff.
This article argues that the potential for success of this large
and growing stormwater discharge program—at least as it is implemented at the federal level—is doubtful. The basis for this
skepticism is not specific to the stormwater program. Instead,
the stormwater regulatory program is illustrative of a larger
problem that has plagued most environmental regulatory programs over the last thirty-five years: these programs are designed in ways that neglect to account for dramatic limits in scientific and technical information. Limitations in information
constrain the options available to regulators to police the release
of pollution or the manufacture of dangerous products. If regulations are designed in blatant disregard of these information constraints—for example, the fact that regulated parties often enjoy
privately held, technical information regarding the risks posed by
their products or activities—the programs are headed for trouble.
Behind this critique of the stormwater regulatory program,
then, is a more general argument about regulation—namely that
limitations in scientific and technical information cannot simply
6 See, e.g., Storm Water Protection Program, The Cities and County of Riverside
ONLY RAIN IN THE STORM DRAIN Pollution Prevention Program, http://www.
floodcontrol.co.riverside.ca.us/stormwater/ (last visited May 12, 2006). For a list of all
Phase I municipal stormwater permits issued in the state of California, go to State Water
Resources Control Board Water Quality, Storm Water Program, http://www.waterboards.
ca.gov/stormwtr/phase_i_municipal.html (last visited May 12, 2006).
7
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000); National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (1990)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122–24 (1990).
8
See EPA, EPA NO. 821-R-99-012, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY OF URBAN
STORMWATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 4-23 (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.
epa.gov/ost/stormwater/usw_b.pdf [hereinafter EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY].
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be accommodated after a regulatory program has been established. We cannot decide, for example, that we want all waters
fishable and swimmable or the air safe for all persons and then
figure out how science can get us there. Instead, competent regulatory design requires an assessment of what science and other
sources of technical information can and cannot offer—at the
front end of regulatory design. Limits in available information
should inform both the ends and the means of how we choose to
regulate. Such a front-end assessment of the available technical
and scientific information is likely to lead to regulatory programs
that look quite different from the programs currently in place, including the federal program regulating stormwater discharges.
The argument that the stormwater regulatory program ignores important limits in available information unfolds in three
parts. Part I makes the larger argument that successful environmental regulation must consider the limits of available scientific information and design regulatory requirements around
those constraints rather than trying to address these limitations
at the back-end, after the program has been established. Examples from several regulatory programs make it clear that this
oversight is neither new nor isolated to the stormwater runoff
program. Part II then outlines the specific types of information
constraints that plague stormwater regulation and identifies how
the EPA’s design of the stormwater discharge regulatory program neglects these constraints and, at some level, seems to
flaunt them. While the failure of the stormwater program to
adequately account for and design its regulatory program around
these information constraints may not devastate the program,
these failures will likely reduce its effectiveness considerably,
particularly in areas where local or state governments are not
enthusiastic about reinforcing the program with more stringent
requirements. Part III closes the article on a more hopeful note
by suggesting some opportunities to redesign the federal stormwater program to better take into account the information that is
and is not available to regulators. While these proposals are not
a panacea for this very challenging field of regulation, they are
likely to be more successful than the current federal program.
I. INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
It is well-established that science is pivotal to most environmental regulation. It is also well-established that the supply of
this scientific and technical information is far less than is needed
to produce effective or comprehensive regulations of man-made
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harms.9 Despite these well-settled truths in environmental regulation, there seems to be little effort to apply them in the practice
of regulatory design. Some of this neglect is forgivable—a fair
number of our programs have their origins in the early 1970’s
when regulators were still learning by trial and error. But some
of the worst offenses—a category that includes stormwater regulatory programs that began in earnest in the 1990’s—are far
more recent and should have been designed in ways that benefited from past mistakes.
A.

Information Constraints in Environmental
Regulation—The Theory

The idea that information can be limited and that policy
analysis and decision-making models must account for these
limitations is a relatively new innovation. Economists Joseph E.
Stiglitz, George A. Akerlof, and A. Michael Spence were awarded
the Nobel Prize in 2001 for their groundbreaking research on
asymmetrical information in markets.10 As a result of their
work, “much of what economists believed—what they thought to
be true on the basis of research and analysis over almost a century—turned out not to be robust to considerations of even slight
imperfections [otherwise known as asymmetries] of information.”11 Economists are now forced to change their assumptions
based on the discoveries that information asymmetries can affect
institutional and individual behavior in important ways.
At a theoretical level, then, we now understand that limitations in information can impose significant and sometimes insurmountable roadblocks to particular ways of doing things.
This does not mean that existing regulatory programs are
doomed to fail. It does mean that successful regulatory design
must first identify the limitations in scientific and technical information that exist and then develop the regulatory program
around these constraints.
In environmental regulation, there are at least three different types of significant limitations in information that occur with
regularity and must be accommodated in regulatory design.
First, there is the familiar problem of “uncertain information”
that involves scientific and technical questions that are unlikely

9 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926, 1926 (2003).
10
See Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
11
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth
Century Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON.1441, 1461 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
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to have immediate or even short-term answers.12 Some of this
uncertainty is due to limitations of scientific knowledge. Scientists do not understand mechanisms of carcinogenicity, hormone
interactions, or neurological effects sufficiently to explain or predict how chemicals will interact in humans or animals.13 Some of
the uncertainty is also due to resource constraints. Even with
the limited scientific knowledge we do possess, we often lack resources to conduct basic tests or conduct extensive monitoring to
resolve uncertainties relevant to regulation. For example, comprehensive monitoring of the environment would tell us something and perhaps a great deal about environmental quality, but
it is exceedingly expensive and we lack the resources to conduct
most of it.14
A second type of information constraint results from asymmetric or “imperfect information.”15 Some information may be
available, or nearly so, only it lies with certain parties who are
disinclined to share it.16 The problems of asymmetrical information are substantial in regulating private actors, and as elaborated later, they are particularly significant in stormwater regulation. Many regulated actors sit atop “mountains of detailed
facts” about the nature of their polluting activities and “amass
specialized private expertise about the ways these activities” and
land uses could introduce pollutants into the environment.17
Since their property is private, access to information about the
pollutants that might be present in stormwater runoff is generally not available to neighbors or regulators unless these groups
are granted permission to enter the site, and even then, pollutants may not be readily apparent in a visual inspection.18 Even
to the extent that these regulated parties do not have direct in12
See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1742
(2004).
13
See, e.g., COMM. ON HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENV’T ET AL.,
HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 1–7 (1999) (identifying great scientific unknowns for hormonally active agents, including mechanisms of action, and identifying several major areas for needed future research).
14
See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES FOR EPA ET AL.,
BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR SOUND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 19, 21, 25, 31 (1997)
(discussing in concrete terms the drastic need for basic monitoring and citing other EPA
studies similarly concluding that there is a need for better environmental monitoring).
15
See Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, The Polluter Pays Versus the Pollutee Pays Principle Under Asymmetric Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 69, 69 (1998).
16
See, e.g., id. at 71 (assuming that a polluter has asymmetric information on the
benefits of the polluting activity).
17 Wagner, supra note 12, at 1641–42.
18
See Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22,
26–29 (1998) (discussing the asymmetrical advantages that private owners enjoy with respect to the presence of endangered species on their land).
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formation about the nature of the stormwater pollution problems
at their site, they are generally in a far better position to obtain
information about the effects of their activities than others.19
Regulated parties know approximately where or what to sample
and what present or past practices might deserve closer inspection, even though they may not have yet done the research. Actors thus also have superior access to information because they
have an “inside track” on where to obtain it and what to look
for.20
The third type of science constraint arises while scientific research or information is still emerging (called “emergent information”) and has not been fully vetted or accepted by the scientific community.21 In the peculiar setting of regulatory controls,
some of this emergent information about toxicity or environmental quality will not be welcome by a large and influential sector of the affected interests—namely regulated parties.22 Instead, it will be hotly contested.23 Given the evolving nature of
scientific discoveries and the loose system of scientific governance that presides over these discoveries, there is no quick and
dirty way for regulators to judge the point at which this developing science is reliable enough to form the basis for regulatory
controls.24 The fact that the information is likely to be hotly contested extends the time during which scientific research can, in
practice, actually inform regulatory programs and constitutes
another information constraint.25 As a result, even when useful
scientific information is produced, the adversarial nature of the
legal system may lead to extensive contests over the reliability of
that information for years before it is accepted as reliable for
purposes of regulation.
In designing a regulatory program, in theory, one would first
identify the types of information needed to establish and meet
regulatory goals. Next, one would assess the extent to which this
needed information is handicapped by one or more of these types
of constraints. If the information is effectively unavailable because it is uncertain, asymmetric, or contested, then it is critical
19

Id.
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 1641–49.
See Timothy Caulfield, The Mass Media’s Influence on Health Law and Policy:
Symposium: Popular Media, Biotechnology, and the “Cycle of Hype,” 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 213, 220 (2005).
22
See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System,
13 J.L. & POL’Y 17, 17–18 (2005).
23
Id.
24
See THOMAS MCGARITY & WENDY WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE ch. 3 (Jan. 9, 2006)
(book in progress, on file with author).
25
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 1649–59.
20
21
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to devise a regulatory strategy that finds a way around these
constraints. For example, a common problem in many pollution
control programs is their failure to anticipate and work around
substantial asymmetries in information between the regulated
and the regulators.26 Regulatory parties often enjoy far more information and access to information about their potential health
or environmental harms than regulators.27 Yet many regulatory
programs ignore these prevalent information asymmetries and
place the burden on regulators to discover health and environmental risks. Our current regulatory programs governing the
filling of wetlands,28 fugitive sources of toxic air pollution,29 the
discovery of contaminated land,30 and the manufacture and sale
of chemicals31 all fall prey to this particular blind spot. By failing
to take the asymmetrical information of the regulated party into
account, they establish regulatory regimes that are barely enforceable and can lead to substantial noncompliance. Similarly, a
regulatory program that expects existing scientific research and
data to magically reveal the point at which a pesticide presents
“unreasonable adverse effects,”32 when air pollutants are controlled sufficiently to “allow[] an adequate margin of safety [to]

26

Id. at 1641–42.
Id.
Under current law, wetland developers are not required to conduct research on
the wetlands they hope to fill to show that they are not environmentally valuable. See 33
U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2001). On the contrary, opponents to the development must bear
the burden of conducting this research, even though the land is often privately held and
its owners can deny the access needed for research.
29
Federal Clean Air Act regulations provide facilities with fugitive sources of air
toxins wide latitude in self-monitoring their compliance with required pollution control
equipment. Under the regulations, a facility is required to self-inspect to ensure compliance with technology-based requirements for fugitive emissions sources only at specified
intervals, sometimes as infrequently as once per year. See Storage Vessel Provisions—
Procedures to Determine Compliance, 40 C.F.R. § 63.120(a) (2004) (requiring visual inspections only once annually for storage vessels). When a facility catches its own violation, there is a period of time during which the facility can repair the problem without
penalty. Under some fugitive pollution rules, this excused repair time can be as long as
forty-five days. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.120(a)(4) (2004).
30 Actors owning land that leaches toxic substances onto neighboring land, into public recreational resources, or into other water supplies (including drinking water supplies), are effectively immunized from reporting their pollution if the amount “appears”
smaller than the reportable quantities defined by regulations. See, e.g., Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (2000) (requiring reports of spills of oil and hazardous substances
only above a threshold amount and, even then, only from vessels or facilities, thus excluding runoff); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000) (requiring reports of releases of hazardous substances
only if they exceed a “reportable quantity”). The contamination may only be discovered if
a governmental entity or other third party identifies the problem.
31
See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1813 (1989) (noting that there is
currently little incentive for chemical manufacturers to undergo expensive testing merely
to point out the flaws in their own products).
32
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (2000).
27
28
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protect the public health,”33 or when surface waters are sufficiently free from pollutants to ensure protection of “the public
health or welfare,”34 is setting itself up for failure.35 Regulated
parties will not only contest the science that exists to answer
these questions, but regulators will find tremendous uncertainties that lack clear answers. For example, Dr. Ken Reckhow, the
Department Chair at Duke University’s Nicholas School for the
Environment, has found that water quality modeling—in the absence of extensive supporting water quality data—is often so error-laden that it might not produce information that is useful at
all.36 Many regulatory programs, including the Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) program of the Clean Water Act do not appreciate these severe information constraints.37 Instead, by insisting that regulatory requirements be based on scientific models that are often badly data-deprived and laden with theoretical
uncertainties, these programs encounter decades of contested
science and resultant regulatory paralysis.38
B.

Information Constraints in Environmental
Regulation—The Practice

Although the bad examples—where regulatory programs fail
to account for prevailing information constraints—far outnumber
the good examples, the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program governing industrial effluent conveniently provides a particularly good example
of a regulatory program that accounts for several critical information constraints in its regulatory design.39 In devising the
NPDES program of the Clean Water Act, Congress reacted to the
substantial uncertainties and imperfections in scientific information that plagued its past efforts to regulate water pollution, and
developed a program that circumvents these constraints.40
33

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
35 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999).
36 K. H. Reckhow & S. C. Chapra, Modeling Excessive Nutrient Loading in the Environment, 100 ENVTL. POLLUTION 197, 206 (1999) (discussing problems in water quality
modeling, much of which stem from inadequate data, and concluding that “it should not
be surprising that theoretically based improvements in a model often cannot be supported
with the limited available observational data”).
37
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP.
10469, 10474-79 (1999) (detailing the series of scientific obstacles that arise in the TMDL
program).
38 Id.
39
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2000).
40
See H.R. REP. NO. 92–911, at 396 (1972) (statement of Rep. Charles Rangel) (observing that “the history of our water pollution control program suggests that State and
Federal governments will continue to founder on the staggering complexity of this control
system, which requires working mathematically back from the permitted pollution levels
34
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As a scientific matter, when the Clean Water Act was passed
in 1972 and to a large extent today, scientists are able to tell us
very little about how much pollution a water body could assimilate before encountering significant ecological damage or presenting serious health risks.41 Even when policymakers set a numeric concentration for a particular pollutant—a level of
acceptable dioxin in rivers and lakes in Virginia, for example—
scientists cannot assure us that the level of discharges that can
be tolerated from various point sources, much less the nonpoint
sources, in order to keep the water quality at roughly that acceptable level.42
Yet despite these and many other unknowns, Congress refused to become paralyzed by the scientific and technical constraints that plague water pollution regulation.43 One thing that
is clear scientifically—both in 1972 and today—is that water pollution is significant, presenting both health threats and ecological damage.44 Scientists have discovered 362 toxins in Great
Lakes water, sediment, and biota; this discovery tells us that
man-made impacts are impairing lake ecosystems.45 Alterations
in the diversity and types of species inhabiting some streams indicate water quality impairments.46 Swimmers recreating near
sewer outfalls experience higher levels of respiratory and other
maladies than swimmers recreating further downstream.47 At an
aggregate level, then, there is little question that serious impairments to some waters result from pollutant loading and that
reducing those loadings will make a positive difference to human
and ecological health.
In order to implement this general scientific knowledge
without hanging up the regulatory program on the scores of more
specific water quality unknowns, Congress devised an ingenious
system that simply required—in very specific and enforceable
ways—that at least those actors discharging wastes into water
in a waterway to the effluent limitations at the point source needed to achieve them”).
41
See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 211–12 (1999) (discussing some of the
scientific uncertainties in setting water quality criteria); Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation
of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528, 10529–31 (1991)
(detailing a series of major scientific uncertainties encountered in the effort to set ambient water quality standards that must be squarely addressed in order to arrive at a final
standard).
42
See, e.g., Houck, supra note 37, at 10472.
43
See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (2000).
44
See, e.g., EPA, The Effects of Great Lakes Contaminants on Human Health,
available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/health/atsdr-ref.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
45
See, e.g., id.
46
See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-35 to 4-36, 4-39 to
4-43.
47
See, e.g., id. at 4-44 to 4-47.
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through a pipe “do their best” to reduce pollution.48 This requirement circumvented one of the major information constraints
that plagues many other regulatory systems—the problem of scientific uncertainties. In its regulatory design, Congress resisted
the need to get specific answers for the point at which waters
were degraded or the types of regulatory controls that would be
needed to clean them up.49 Instead, this “do our best” or technology-based pollution control approach simply requires the main
dischargers to limit their loadings to what regulators determine
is technologically feasible.50
Congress also directly confronted the problems of asymmetric information enjoyed by regulated parties in designing the
NPDES program.51 Industrial dischargers have superior knowledge of what “doing their best” encompasses and whether they
are actually accomplishing that “best” on a daily basis. Rather
than task poor regulators with the job of checking on the representations of regulated parties that they are minimizing their
pollution loads, Congress also instructed the EPA to find out—on
an industry-by-industry basis—what doing one’s best actually
was and to put that result into a single numerical effluent standard that applied to all similar industries.52 In this way, the
regulator would have the burden of devising categorical industry
effluent limits, but once put in place, there would no longer be
the need for regulators to become familiar with the capabilities of
individual dischargers in order to finalize permit requirements.53
An even more brilliant element of the NPDES program is the
self-monitoring requirement. Because dischargers have considerable asymmetrical information regarding whether they are in
compliance with generic effluent limits, Congress, with the help
of the EPA, devised a scheme whereby all regulated parties
48
See Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159,
199 n.194 (1983) (quoting Senator Bayh as explaining that the technology-based standards adopted in the 1972 Clean Water Act were intended to “force industry to do the best
job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to keep making progress without incurring
such massive costs that economic chaos would result.”) (citing Senate Comm. on Pub.
Works, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1133 (1973)); see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A)
(2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
49
Michael R. Bosse, George J. Mitchell: Maine’s Environmental Senator, 47 ME. L.
REV. 179, 184 (1995) (“Congress’s intent is to reevaluate environmental statutes such as
the Clean Water Act periodically to ensure that the law reflects the current state of ongoing scientific knowledge and changing circumstances.”).
50
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (2000).
51
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1)–(3) (2000).
52
See, e.g., Du Pont v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977).
53
John H. Minan, Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System (MS4) Regulation Under
the Federal Clean Water Act: The Role of Water Quality Standards?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1215, 1232 n.95 (2005).
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would monitor their own effluent at regular intervals.54 While
some asymmetries in information remain and their existence undercuts compliance,55 the private informational advantages of the
discharger are generally overcome by this regulatory scheme:
dischargers have few choices but to monitor their effluent honestly and to disclose those effluent numbers to regulators and the
public at large.56
In short, the NPDES program circumvents the largest problems of uncertain and imperfect information. Once the effluent
standards were promulgated, this left the EPA with a regulatory
program that could be implemented relatively smoothly—at least
in comparison to science-dependent regulatory programs. Moreover, the likelihood of regulated parties holding up the program
by contesting emerging scientific information is also circumvented since scientific information is generally not relevant to
this technology-based standard-setting and permitting process.57
But the NPDES program governing industrial effluent is
hardly perfect. It was so skillful in circumventing the need for
scientific information that it neglected to develop mechanisms for
collecting water quality data that might enable more scienceintensive regulation in the future.58 The “do your best” standard,
in fact, will not achieve even the most primitive water quality objectives (sight and smell) in some settings where a water body
cannot assimilate numerous industrial discharges that enter the
water at once.59 Thus, the need for some second-tier, sciencebased form of regulation was inevitable, but was not established
in a coherent way. However, with this one important exception,
the NPDES program exemplifies smart regulatory design, at
54

See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (2000).
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-21, ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT: EPA CANNOT ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF SELF-REPORTED COMPLIANCE
MONITORING DATA (Mar. 1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/149103.pdf [hereinafter GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT] (finding that sampling methods employed by
regulated parties were not reviewed by EPA inspectors in roughly two-thirds of the states
surveyed, enabling regulated parties’ accidental errors or deliberately falsified results to
remain undetected).
56
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 101–03 (2000).
57
Id. at 1651–53 (noting that when science-based standards are used, the strategy
employed by many regulated parties is to discredit the science behind the standard: “In
some cases, because of the inherent complexity of the studies, even if high-quality technical research can be at least temporarily discredited by making groundless challenges
about the methods used, the reliability of the data collected, the qualifications of the researcher conducting the study, or by suggesting that the review processes are flawed.”).
58
See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 69, 84-85 (1988).
59
It is obviously difficult to set water quality control standards when there are multiple sources of pollution entering a single body of water at once. See, e.g., Esther Bartfeld,
Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43,
74 (1993).
55
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least with regard to its maneuverability around significant information constraints. In fact, critics of the program have been
far too quick to overlook the severity of information constraints
and the program’s effectiveness in overcoming them.60
II. FEDERAL STORMWATER DISCHARGE REGULATIONS:
THE NEGLECT OF THE INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS
Stormwater discharge regulation is set within this larger
NPDES program that governs industrial effluent discharges and
ranks among the best at identifying and working around potentially fatal significant science constraints.61 But the extension of
the NPDES program to the regulation of stormwater discharges
neglects the underlying information constraints that explain why
the NPDES program developed in the way it did. As a result,
stormwater regulation ironically runs headlong into precisely the
same types of information constraints that the NPDES program
was designed to avoid.
A. Background: The Science and Law of Stormwater
Discharge Regulation
The regulation of stormwater runoff confronts the same scientific constraints that plague controlling pollutants in industrial
effluent, but encounters added uncertainties in quantifying the
variable pollutant loads that occur in runoff. At the same time,
much like the traditional NPDES program, those in charge of the
land or outfalls that carry the runoff into the waters enjoy considerable private information or access to information about the
types of problems that might be occurring at their sites.62
1. Additional Uncertainties in Characterizing
Stormwater Runoff
As is the case for industrial discharges, there are large scientific uncertainties involved in attempting to trace specific sources
of stormwater runoff to individual environmental or health
harms. While broad scientific connections can be made (i.e., fecal
coliform loadings do not make for good swimming conditions), it
has been difficult to move beyond these very general correlations
between pollution and public health and environmental harms.63
60
See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 328–30 (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–37 (1985).
61
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 56, at 96–97.
62
See generally GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 55 (explaining
the EPA’s use of self-reporting for monitoring compliance and also under the wastewater
discharge and hazardous waste programs).
63
See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-44 to 4-47.
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Scientists have, however, attributed significant adverse water
quality consequences to cumulative stormwater runoff.64 Given
the role of precipitation in mobilizing many of the pollutants,
stormwater loadings are obviously far more variable than traditional industrial sources; this runoff includes some very toxic
substances and large amounts of sediment that impair water
quality.65 Scientists have also identified major sources of pollutants in stormwater runoff that include motor vehicle exhaust,
construction activities, industrial operations, and suburban lawn
products like fertilizers and pesticides.66
But there are some added uncertainties that affect the regulation of stormwater runoff. First, measuring the effectiveness of
site controls designed to minimize pollutants in stormwater runoff is considerably less certain than isolating the effluent pollution control gains made at an industrial operation as a result of
installing the best pollution control technology.67 In the industrial effluent NPDES program, the EPA was able to identify an
industry “average” within a category—like an average iron
manufacturer that makes iron using a blast furnace—and then
quantify the pollutants in the effluent of that average factory if it
installs the best available pollution control technology.68 Although there are inevitable error bars surrounding these average
effluent limitations, the error bars remain sufficiently small and
most facilities are still able to comply with the promulgated effluent limits. By contrast, the error bars and uncertainties surrounding the pollution control capabilities of various BMPs for
any given industrial site, construction site or municipal storm
sewer are far larger and could vary substantially from one property to another.69 Natural causes of variation in the pollutant
loads in stormwater runoff include the topography of a site, the
soil conditions, and of course, the nature of storm flows in intensity, frequency, and volume.70 In addition, the manner in which
the facility stores and uses materials, the amount of impervious
64
See, e.g., id. at 4-48; EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1994 REPORT TO
CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24 (1994), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/305b/94report/nat_sum.pdf (noting the significant contributions
of pollution that stormwater runoff makes and attributing 46 percent of the identified
cases of water quality impairment in estuaries to storm sewer runoff).
65
See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-6.
66
See, e.g., id. at 4-9.
67
See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EPA/600/R-04/184, THE
USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPS) IN URBAN WATERSHEDS 4-2 (Sept. 2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ordntrnt/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/600r04184/600r04184.htm [hereinafter EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES].
68
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 420.33(a) (2004).
69
See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5-15
to 5-17.
70
Id. at 5-12 to 5-15.
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cover, and sometimes even what materials the facility uses can
vary and affect pollutant loads in runoff from one site to another.71 Together these sources of variability—particularly the
natural features—make it much more difficult to identify or predict a meaningful “average” pollutant load of stormwater runoff
from a facility that adopts BMPs for the site.72
Second, the impediments to measuring the actual amounts of
pollutants present in runoff contribute still more uncertainty to
stormwater runoff controls. Because stormwater runoff is so
variable over time and space, it is difficult to gauge a site’s pollutant contributions through a single grab sample.73 Indeed,
monitors would need to take almost continuous samples of the
runoff whenever it rained because of fluctuations in pollutant
loadings over the course of a storm event.74 Yet the costs of this
type of monitoring could be substantial, and since the pollution is
from runoff, rather than industrial effluent, the regulated owners
and facilities may be less prepared to absorb these additional
costs or pass them on to customers in the form of their products
or services.75 Monitoring runoff is thus less practicable than
monitoring effluent from an industrial facility and adds further
uncertainties to the evaluation of how well BMPs and other site
controls are working.
The asymmetries in information regarding the types of pollutants in stormwater runoff appear roughly the same as the
asymmetries in information regarding industrial effluent. The
owner or operator of a parcel of land has the best and perhaps
the only access to information on the extent to which the land
has been disturbed, the types of sealant used on the asphalt, the
materials that have been disposed of on the land, and other activities that could affect the pollutants in runoff. The owners, in
other words, enjoy asymmetrical information or at least superior
71
See generally id. at 4-2 (recognizing the impact of related variables on accurate
BMP monitoring).
72
See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at
4-2 (providing that “a wide variety of underlying conditions may exist, making a one-sizefits-all approach to BMP monitoring infeasible”).
73
See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4-2;
EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EPA/625/R-93/004, HANDBOOK: URBAN
RUNOFF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL PLANNING, ch. 5 (Sept. 1993), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/625r93004/625r93004.pdf [hereinafter EPA, HANDBOOK].
74
See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at
4-2 (suggesting that the “temporal and spacial variation concerning stormwater pollutant
loads” complicates collection to the degree that multiple grabs may be necessary in order
to ensure accuracy of BMPs).
75
Cf. Chris A. Mattison, New Storm Water Regulations Affect Municipalities and
Smaller Construction Operations, 29 COLO. LAW. 71, 75 (Feb. 2000) (referencing the costs
of compliance with federal stormwater regulations and suggesting that they might be too
high for some regulated parties).
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access to this information that helps characterize the nature of
the pollutant loading occurring through storm runoff. The owner
also best knows what it will take to minimize these releases, or
at least can generally discover this information most cheaply.
Thus, in stormwater discharge control, existing asymmetries
in information regarding the types of pollutants that might be released into runoff are compounded by scientific uncertainties,
making it nearly impossible for the EPA to a reliable, external
measure of the types of pollutants that are actually being released from the site through stormwater runoff. The inability to
easily measure pollution in runoff makes it difficult to know precisely what a landowner should do differently or whether newlyinstalled pollution controls are working. These added uncertainties make it much more difficult to oversee private owners’ contributions to runoff pollution.
2. The Federal Stormwater NPDES Program
Despite the scientific differences between regulating industrial effluent discharged from a factory and the stormwater discharge that collects from a street, an industrial lot, or a construction site, the Clean Water Act (and the EPA) generally treats
them the same.76 This similar treatment of industrial and
stormwater discharges is in part a historical/legal artifact: both
types of discharges often occur through “discrete conveyances”
and thus fall legally into the same regulatory category of “point
sources.”77 This similar treatment is also the likely result of convenience. The NPDES system is well-established and has been
relatively successful; therefore, sweeping one more type of pipe
within this system leads to the least amount of political backlash
and bureaucratic upheaval.

76
77

1977).

See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000).
See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir.
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Figure 1: A Step-by-Step Comparison of the NPDES Industrial
Effluent Program with the NPDES Stormwater Program

Step 1: Identify Regulated Sources
Step 2: Identify Compliance Requirements

Step 3: Self-Monitor to
Ensure Compliance

Traditional
NPDES
Program
Governing
Industrial Effluent
Legally covered sources
self-identify and insert
themselves in the system.
Numeric effluent limits
are promulgated in the
C.F.R.

Sources must self-monitor
their effluent regularly, if
not continuously, and
submit results to the
agency in the form of
monthly discharge monitoring reports.

Stormwater
Program

NPDES

Legally covered sources
self-identify and insert
themselves in the system.
Sources
identify
best
management practices for
their sites and develop
plans that describe how
they will establish and
maintain the practices.
Sources self-monitor their
compliance by conducting
periodic onsite inspections
and keeping records of
those inspections.
In
some cases, self-monitoring includes sampling
runoff annually or quarterly, but the discharger
enjoys considerable discretion in sampling.

In practice, however, merging the two programs has caused
the EPA to force-fit stormwater regulation into the industrial effluent model. Rather than identifying the obvious differences in
the scientific uncertainties between these two pollution programs
and coming up with new approaches that circumvent the added
uncertainties that afflict stormwater, the EPA applies the old
NPDES model to stormwater runoff in cookie-cutter fashion.78
When extending the NPDES model to stormwater runoff requires
adjustments, the EPA reaches for the most obvious analog, without any apparent awareness of the added information constraints
that arise in its modified program.
As Figure 1 shows, the stormwater NPDES program tracks
the traditional industrial effluent NPDES program step-by-step,
despite the significant differences between the information constraints that afflict the programs.79 First, like its industrial effluent prototype, the stormwater NPDES program lists a number
of “covered” sources that are officially included in the program
and expects these sources to self-identify themselves and apply
78
79

See supra Figure 1.
See supra Figure 1.
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for a permit.80 The EPA’s federal stormwater discharge program
is divided into two phases that encompass increasingly smaller
sources of stormwater discharges.81 The first phase—finalized in
1990—regulates stormwater discharges from ten types of industrial operations (this includes the entire manufacturing sector),
construction occurring on more than five acres, and medium or
large storm sewers in areas that serve more than 100,000 people.82 The second phase—finalized in 1995—includes smaller
municipal storm sewer systems and smaller construction sites
(down to one acre).83 If these covered sources fail to apply for a
permit, they are in violation of the Clean Water Act.84 Because
the sources are smaller and more diverse, however, the stormwater permit process is far more convoluted and sprawling than the
NPDES program governing industrial effluent—a feature that
might prevent some stormwater sources from understanding
their legal obligation to apply for a permit.85 See Figure 2.86

80 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-240, STORM WATER
POLLUTION: INFORMATION NEEDED ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF PERMITTING OIL AND GAS
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 6–7 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05240.pdf [hereinafter GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION].
81
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 122–24 (1990)) (promulgating phase I regulations); Amendment to Requirements for
National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) Permits for Storm Water Discharges Under Section 402(p)(6) of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (Aug. 7,
1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 124 (1995) (promulgating phase II regulations).
82
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(3) (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (b)(14) (1990).
83
See generally Amendment to Requirements for National Pollutant Discharge
Eliminating System (NPDES) Permits for Storm Water Discharges Under Section
402(p)(6) of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (Aug. 7, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 122, 124 (1995)).
84
GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 55, at 12.
85
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1) (2000).
86
GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION, supra note 80, at 11.
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Figure 2: Activities Covered under Phase I and II of the NPDES Storm Water
Program

U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-240, Storm Water Pollution: Information
Needed on the Implications of Permitting Oil and Gas Construction Activities 11 (Feb.
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05240.pdf.
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Second, in an attempt to develop a close analog to the numerical effluent requirements in the industrial effluent NPDES
program, stormwater NPDES permits also identify compliance
requirements, although these almost always take the form of site
controls and other narrative, rather than numerical requirements.87 In the stormwater program, each of the three different
types of sources of stormwater discharges—construction, municipal, and industry—are required to adopt a series of BMPs or the
equivalent to minimize the runoff of pollutants on site in order to
be in compliance with the permit system.88 Because of sampling
difficulties, numerical effluent limits for the runoff are the exception rather than the rule in stormwater permits.89 Even for degraded waters subject to TMDLs, any added monitoring that
might be required for stormwater runoff may provide only limited information because sampling is restricted to the pollutants
that cause the segment to degrade.90 Although multiple types of
permits are available, in most situations, stormwater sources
avail themselves of a more flexible, “general” permit option.91
Along with their general permit application, the discharger submits its Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) that
identifies sources of pollution on site and identifies the BMPs
that it will install and maintain.92 In selecting BMPs, the discharger selects from a menu of options devised by the EPA or, in
some cases, the states or locales for their particular facility.93
For example, the regulated party will generally identify structural BMPs, such as fences and impoundments that minimize
runoff, and describe how they will be installed.94 The Plan must
also include nonstructural BMPs, like good housekeeping practices, that require the source to manage the site in a way to
minimize the opportunity for pollutants to be exposed to stormwater runoff.95 This Plan and the accompanying BMPs constitute the compliance requirements for the stormwater discharger
and is essentially the analog to the numeric effluent limits listed
87

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
See generally EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 1–4.
89
See id. at 1.
90
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 420.32-420.36 (2004).
91
Bonni Kaufman, Lawrence R. Liebesman & Rafe Petersoen, Regulation of Stormwater Pollution: An Area of Increasing Importance to the Construction Industry, MONDAQ
BUSINESS BRIEFING, Oct. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=35276&lastestnews=1; EPA, OVERVIEW OF
THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-1.
92
See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3;
EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 11.
93
EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15.
94
See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5-4 to
5-5.
95
See, e.g., Kaufman et al., supra note 91.
88
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for industrial effluents in the Code of Federal Regulations.96
Third and even more different from the industrial effluent
permits is the EPA’s struggle to develop an analog for the vital
self-monitoring requirement. In contrast to the end-of-the-pipe
monitor installed for sampling industrial effluent, there is simply
no easy or straightforward way to develop a self-monitoring system for sampling stormwater runoff.97 Rather than depart from
the traditional NPDES model and develop some different method
for externally measuring runoff or permittee compliance, the
EPA requires facilities to continue to “self-monitor” through periodic onsite inspections that are documented in the companies’
onsite records.98 Typically, general stormwater discharge permits do not require any quantitative monitoring of runoff to test
the effectiveness of site controls.99 Instead, only a subset of dischargers are actually required to take samples and an even
smaller subset of those sources must actually take quantitative
samples (as opposed to visual samples); moreover, as described in
detail below, the permittee enjoys discretion in when and how to
sample.100
B.

Implementation of the Stormwater Discharge Program:
Running Face-first into the Information Constraints

On its face, the extension of the industrial effluent NPDES
permit system to stormwater sources is a logical one: Like an
operating industry, the stormwater source must “do their best” to
minimize the runoff of pollutants into drains and self-monitor
their own compliance with these “do your best [management
practices]” commitments.101 But under the surface, there are
dramatic differences between these two parallel permit systems,
especially with regard to the information available to regulators
who oversee compliance. Under the traditional NPDES permit
system, the regulator overcomes the regulated party’s superior
access to information by specifying the regulatory requirements
with precision and requiring the source to install monitors that
take samples at regular intervals.102 Although some cheating
still takes place, this system overcomes asymmetrical information problems with respect to compliance by instituting a moni96

40 C.F.R. §§ 420–471.106 (2004).
See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at
5-20 to 5-21.
98
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 21–22; EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE
STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-4.
99
See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 3.
100
See EPA, NPDES, supra note 3, at §§ 3.2.6.1, 3.2.6.2.
101
See id. at 15.
102
33 U.S.C.A. § 1314 (2000).
97
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toring or oversight system that provides almost no operator discretion.103
Stormwater permits attempt to adopt similar requirements
in keeping with the NPDES prototype, but the added scientific
uncertainties of stormwater runoff do not allow for easy analogs.
As a result, there are three vital differences in implementation of
the stormwater NPDES program that leave much superior information, and hence compliance discretion with the discharger.
First, unlike industrial pipes that carry wastes from their factories out to receiving waters, the physical presence of covered
stormwater discharge sources is less visible or obvious. Thus,
particularly for some industrial and construction sources, if a
stormwater source does not self-report and apply for a permit,
the probability of detecting it is much lower than the traditional
NPDES permit system. The second major difference is the permittee’s role in selecting the “do your best” compliance requirements.104 The selection of BMPs and their embodiment in a larger pollution prevention plan can introduce ambiguity into the
requirements if the permittee is clever about drafting the requirements in general terms. Third and most importantly, there
are only loose self-monitoring requirements and these leave the
source with considerable discretion.105 This exacerbates the problems of asymmetrical information involved in the already ambiguous compliance requirements, leaving the regulator even
more handicapped in ensuring compliance and the regulated
source less concerned about the possibility of meaningful enforcement. Each of these challenges is elaborated in detail below.
1. Identifying Stormwater Sources in Need of Permitting
Both the NPDES industrial and stormwater programs depend on the regulated party to self-report their existence and apply for a permit.106 The failure of sources to self-identify has been
a problem that has plagued industrial effluent regulation; however, the problem may be far worse for some stormwater sources,
particularly from industrial and construction sites that can be
more obscure. As long as there is a low probability of regulators
identifying and catching stormwater sources compared to sources
of industrial effluent, then compliance with the stormwater
NPDES program can be expected to be lower than compliance
with the industrial NPDES program. For a number of stormwater sources—construction being the most notorious—one can ex103

Id.
See EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15.
See id.
106
33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2000).
104
105
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pect a great deal of slippage to occur between those sources who
should be covered by a permit and those who actually make the
effort to apply.
Evidence suggests that many industrial and construction
stormwater sources are failing to self-report and hence remain
unpermitted and unregulated.107 In Maine, less than twenty percent of the stormwater sources that fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the federal stormwater program actually applied for
permits before 2005—more than a decade after the federal regulations were promulgated.108 Yet there is no record of enforcement action taken by Maine against the unpermitted sources
during that interim period.109 Indeed, in the one enforcement action brought by citizens in Maine for an unpermitted discharge,
the source claimed ignorance of the stormwater program.110 In
Washington, the state Department of Ecology speculates that between ten and twenty-five percent of all businesses covered by
the federal stormwater permit program are actually permitted.111
In response to this problem, the EPA appears to be targeting
enforcement against stormwater sources that do not have permits. In several cases, the EPA pursued regulated industries
that failed to apply for stormwater permits.112 The EPA has also
brought enforcement actions against at least three construction
companies for failing to apply for a stormwater permit for their
construction runoff.113 Such enforcement actions help to make
the stormwater program more visible and give the appearance of
a higher probability of enforcement associated with noncompliance. Nevertheless, the non-intuitive features of needing a
permit to discharge stormwater, coupled with a rational perception of a low probability of being caught, likely encourage some
107
There is also evidence of creative compliance to avoid triggering the permit requirements. In a study by the GAO of the implications of the stormwater NPDES permit
program for oil and gas construction activities, one facility conceded that it actually broke
their operations into smaller sites to avoid triggering the five acre minimum for Phase I
construction stormwater permit requirements. See, e.g., GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION,
supra note 80, at 13-14.
108
See John Richardson, Maine Makes it Clear: Watch your Stormwater; Businesses
are Being Warned About Meeting the Rules on Polluted Runoff, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Nov. 28, 2005, at A1 (in Maine, 330 businesses applied for stormwater permits in the
state; approximately 1500 facilities in the state are likely to be covered by that program).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Robert McClure, Stormwater Bill Raises Concern, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 25, 2004, at B1.
112 See, e.g., Press Release, EPA, EPA Orders Oakland Facility to Comply with its
Stormwater Permit, (June 22, 2005) (on file with Chapman Law Review); Kaufman, et al.,
supra note 91.
113
See Press Release, EPA, Three NH Companies Agree to Pay Fine to Settle EPA
Complaint; Case is Part of EPA Push to Improve Compliance with Stormwater Regulations (Aug. 10, 2004) (on file with Chapman Law Review).
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sources to fail to enter the system at all.
2. Prescribing Compliance requirements
In contrast to the numerical limits listed in the Code of Federal Regulations for industrial effluent, stormwater sources design their own pollution plan for minimizing pollutants in their
stormwater runoff.114 This involves two steps, both of which can
involve significant amounts of discretion that favor the regulated
party.
First, the source must evaluate the site for problematic pollutants; but where the regulated party does not have specific
knowledge or data, they need only offer “estimates” and “predictions” of the types of pollutants that might be present at the
site.115 See Figure 3. These requirements are unlikely to lead
regulated parties to rise to the occasion of conducting a rigorous
site assessment. Instead, these types of nebulous informational
demands leave regulated parties with incentives to avoid expensive sampling that will only have the potential to increase their
compliance obligations. With the exception of visible features,
the deferential site investigation requirements, paired with the
parties’ asymmetrical access to information, allow them to describe site conditions in ways that largely escape accountability.
Given this discretion, ignorance regarding the site conditions will
generally be bliss.

114

See generally EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15.
See EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3, V-3;
supra Figure 3.
115
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Figure 3: EPA’s Required Description of the Site
The description of potential pollutant sources must include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

A map of the facility indicating the areas which drain to each storm water discharge point
An indication of the industrial activities which occur in each drainage area
A prediction of the pollutants which are likely to be present in the storm water
A description of the likely sources of pollutants from the site
An inventory of materials that may be exposed to storm water
The history of spills and leaks of toxic or hazardous materials for the last
three years.

The measures and controls to prevent or minimize pollution of storm water
must include:

•
•
•
•
•

Good housekeeping or upkeep of industrial areas exposed to storm water
Preventative maintenance of storm water controls and other facility equipment
Spill prevention and response procedures to minimize the potential for and
the impact of spills
Test all outfalls to ensure that there are no illicit discharges
Training of employees on pollution prevention measures and controls, and record keeping.

The permit also requires that facilities:

•
•

Identify areas with a high potential for erosion and the stabilization measures
or structural controls to be used to limit erosion in these areas
Implement traditional storm water management measures (oil/water separators, vegetative swales, detention ponds, etc.) where they are appropriate for
the site.

Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, IV-3 to
IV-4 (June 1996) (summarizing applicable regulatory requirements), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf.

Second, sources must then develop a pollution prevention
plan that best accomplishes reductions in pollutant loads at that
particular site, a role that again allows them to capitalize on
their asymmetric information.116 See Figure 4. In this setting, a
rational actor can be expected to choose BMPs and develop a pollution prevention plan that is as inexpensive as possible with the
lowest amount of maintenance and oversight, rather than a plan
that is especially effective at reducing polluted runoff. Despite
the EPA’s instructions to consider a laundry list of considerations
that will help the facility settle on the most effective pollution
plan,117 regulated parties are likely to look harder at the cost side
116
See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3;
infra Figure 4.
117
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 20.
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of the ledger in determining how to design their compliance obligations. Indeed, there are no obvious benefits or extra credit for
particularly vigorous or effective plans. Unless the source can
figure out a way to eliminate all pollutant threats and be eligible
for a “no exposure” waiver,118 their extra effort will be unrewarded and unnoticed. In such a setting, doing the bare minimum is the most rational response.

Figure 4: EPA’s BMP Identification
Requirements
Plans are required to contain a description of the
controls and measures to prevent or minimize pollution of storm water and a specific schedule with
interim milestones as to when measures and controls will be implemented. The measures and controls to prevent and minimize pollution of storm
water must include:
• Good housekeeping in industrial areas
exposed to storm water
• Preventative maintenance of storm water
controls and other facility equipment
• Spill prevention and response procedures
to minimize the potential for and the impact of
• Training of employees on pollution prevention measures and record keeping
• Identification of areas with a high potential for erosion and the stabilization
measures or structural controls to be
used to limit erosion
• Implementation of traditional storm water management measures (oil/water
separators, vegetative swales, detention
ponds, etc.) where they are appropriate
for the site.
Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE
STORMWATER PROGRAM, VI-4 (June 1996) (summarizing
applicable regulatory requirements), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf.

118

See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g) (2004).
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In developing the terms of their pollution prevention plan, rational facilities are more likely to develop ambiguous compliance
requirements that leave them with discretion in determining
compliance.119 Rather than require sampling and measurements
of pollutants on-site, “routine” or “regularly scheduled” visual inspections will be preferred.120 These types of wishy-washy standards allow regulated parties to argue that they are in compliance in the unlikely event that the one regulator in the state
assigned to stormwater runoff actually conducts a site investigation.121
The EPA does not anticipate or make much effort to curb
this rational choice behavior by sources to maximize their compliance discretion. Instead, the EPA describes many of the permit requirements in general terms that afford even greater discretion to regulated parties. For example, the EPA commands
the regulated party to “implement any additional BMPs that are
economically reasonable and appropriate in light of current industry practice, and are necessary to eliminate or reduce pollutants in . . . stormwater discharges.”122 In instructing dischargers
on the trigger events that require them to update their pollution
plans, the EPA similarly provides “loophole” terms that allow
many sources to escape this responsibility simply by interpreting
the ambiguous terms broadly:
You must review, and amend your SWPPP as appropriate
whenever there is: construction or a change in design, operation
or maintenance at your facility such that these situations have a
significant impact on the discharge, or potential for discharge, of
pollutants from your facility; [or] whenever your routine inspection or compliance evaluation determines deficiencies in your
BMPs . . . . 123
Perhaps to make its requirement nevertheless appear rigid,
the EPA then demands that these modifications to SWPPPs
“must be made within 14 calendar days after discovery, observation or event requiring a SWPPP modification.”124 So the facility
has relatively free reign—aside from obvious disasters—to decide
119
Facility operators, in preparing a SWPPP, “must include [BMPs], economically
reasonable and appropriate in light of current industry practices, that are selected, designed, installed, implemented and maintained in accordance with good engineering practices to eliminate or reduce all pollutants in [their] discharge . . . .” Such language gives
facility operators flexibility wide latitude in determining compliance. See, e.g., EPA,
NPDES, supra note 3, at 15.
120
Id. at 20, 132.
121
See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
122
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 23.
123
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
124
Id.
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when to update the plan, but once it makes this decision to update, it must do so in fourteen days.
The extent of regulator oversight in reviewing these pollution plans is also likely to vary tremendously, providing still
more room for permittee discretion in locales where regulatory
review is limited.125 In states or locales where the interest or
administrative resources are low, the regulator is likely to only
review the facial adequacy of the plan and not conduct a corresponding site investigation.126 Therefore, if problems are not addressed by the facility in their plan, pollution problems may
never be redressed or caught at all by the EPA, state, or local
agencies. Due to the source’s asymmetrical information in preparing the plan, a regulator is substantially handicapped in ensuring that the plan captures the “best” that the source can do in
terms of management practices.
Allowing regulated parties who enjoy private advantages in
accessing information to both identify the problems and implement what they believe is the best solution, without clear external measures of accountability, erects a regulatory system that
creates perverse incentives for ignorance and keeps regulated
parties largely unaccountable to regulators and the public. Only
regulated parties will know if the potential sources of pollution
on their facility have been adequately identified.127 Only they
will know whether the plan provides the best way to address
these problems, and they will have far more access to information
to determine their own compliance with the plan. Finally, to the
extent that there is much discretion in determining compliance,
they will enjoy the role of arbiter.
Conversely, if the regulated party invests resources measuring pollutant loads on their property, they are creating a paper
trail that puts them at risk of greater regulation. Under the
EPA’s regulations, a regulated party “must provide a summary of
existing stormwater discharge sampling data previously taken at
[its] facility,” but if there are no data or sampling efforts, then

125
Currently, the public is generally not involved in the review of a facility’s SWPPP
and there is no formal opportunity for public participation. See, e.g., Caltrans, Water
Quality NewsFlash (Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/env/
stormwater/publicat/newsflash/9_26_05.pdf (discussing the potential effect of recent U.S.
appellate decisions on current stormwater permit practice, which is not to provide the
public with an opportunity to review SWPPPs).
126
But see Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (suggesting the EPA is encouraging the
states to conduct their own investigations).
127
The regulated party is expected to identify these problems, but there is no check
on the amount of effort they use to inventory possible problems or whether they err on the
side or over- or under-inclusiveness in this estimation. See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra
note 3, at 18.
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the facility is off the hook.128 Quantitative measures can be incriminating, particularly in a regulatory setting where the regulator is willing to settle for estimates. Real data documenting
problems provides regulators with evidence that there may be
problematic sources of pollutants in stormwater runoff, leading
them to insist on more controls than for a comparable, unsampled site.129
3. Ensuring Compliance
The regulated party is also responsible for self-monitoring its
compliance.130 But unlike the NPDES program where there are
quantitative measures of compliance, the self-inspections and
self-monitoring requirements are general and leave much greater
discretion that favor the regulated party.131
As part of their pollution plan, all stormwater sources are
required to self-inspect their facilities,132 but like the discretion
afforded to them in most other aspects of devising these plans,
the inspection requirements are also ambiguous and quite deferential.133 See Figure 5. Sources are required to keep records of
the inspections, but this appears to be the outer limit of their accountability for these inspections.134 Short of having a compliance officer visit the site, there is effectively no way to ensure
that the regulated party is complying with their BMPs and other
regulatory requirements in a rigorous way.135 As a result, in the
current design of the stormwater program, a regulated source
can do a poor job implementing BMPs without much, if any, accountability. For example, if a source is supposed to build a siltfence as required by their pollution prevention plan, there is little to keep them from building one that meets only the minimum
requirements. During the ensuing years as the fence deteriorates, the fact that it is still standing might be counted by the
source as adequate for purposes of complying with its stormwater
pollution prevention plan.136
128
See, e.g., id. at 20; see also EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra
note 2, at V-2 (showing same requirement for construction permit).
129
See generally Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (indicating that the EPA is now
cracking down on companies that have not obtained permits).
130
EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 24.
131
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2)-(b)(2) (2000) (outlining requirements for compliance under NPDES) with EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 26 (outlining requirements
for self-compliance under EPA regulations).
132
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 21.
133
EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-4; see supra
Figure 5.
134
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 22.
135
See generally id. at 21–22 (illustrating the lax requirements of self-inspection and
employee training of inspection teams).
136
Cf. Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (“For example, a silt fence that sags for several
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Figure 5: EPA’s Inspection/Site Compliance
Evaluation Requirements
Facility personnel must inspect the plant equipment and industrial areas on a regular basis. At least once a year or more a
thorough site compliance evaluation must be performed by facility personnel. Personnel conducting the evaluation shall:
• Look for evidence of, or the potential for, pollutants entering
the drainage system
• Evaluate the performance of pollution prevention measures
• Revise the pollution prevention plan based on the results
of the evaluation in order to reduce
• the discharge of pollutants
• Document both the routine inspections and the annual site
compliance evaluation in a report.
Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER
PROGRAM, IV-4 (June 1996) (summarizing applicable regulatory requirements), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf.

Federal regulations do supplement these self-inspections
with sampling requirements for a subset of sources, yet even
these more data-driven requirements still leave regulated parties
with some discretion.137 Most industrial facilities, for example,
are required to conduct a visual inspection of a grab sample of
their stormwater runoff on a quarterly basis and describe the
visual appearance of the sample in a document that is kept on
file at the site.138 Certainly, a visual sample is better than nothing, but the requirement not only allows the source some discretion in determining how and when to take the sample (explained
below), but also discretion in how to describe the sample.139 A
smaller list of facilities must actually quantitatively sample
listed pollutants in their stormwater runoff on a quarterly basis.140 Yet while the EPA’s sampling guidelines specify that these
days in-between inspections may be considered by [the] EPA to be a violation for each day
that it is not fixed, despite the fact that under the SWPPP the fence is not required to be
inspected during that several day period. Labeling such an event a permit violation (subject to up to $27,500 of fines per day) would appear inconsistent with the notion that inspections, followed by maintenance and repair of problems identified in the inspection are
fundamental to BMPs.”).
137
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 27.
138
See, e.g., id. at 28; EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2,
at VI-5.
139
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 29 (allowing a regulated party to
visually monitor just one outfall if others are believed to “discharge substantially identical
effluents . . . .”).
140
See, e.g., id. at 93-94.
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samples should be taken within thirty minutes after the storm
begins, and only if it is the first storm in three days, that is the
limit of the restrictions governing sampling.141 The owner’s personnel determines which storm they will use for their monitoring
requirement and at which point during that first half-hour to
take the grab sample.142 This is not to suggest that owners will
cheat. However, the guidelines—in some cases by necessity—
provide sources with relatively wide bounds for conducting this
sampling.143 If the owners have an interest in measuring only
low pollutant levels in their samples, these guidelines provide
them the discretion to cherry-pick storms and, to some extent,
times during which to collect the sample during a storm.144 Although municipalities are required to do more extensive sampling of runoff and enjoy less sampling discretion,145 even municipalities are allowed to select what they believe are their most
representative outfalls for purposes of monitoring pollutant
loads.
Even in cases where the party reports high pollution loads in
these quarterly samples, the source is generally required only to
use its discretion to amend its plan to do better.146 Given the
enormous variability in storms and stormwater runoff concentrations, even within the first thirty minutes of any storm event, it
is no wonder the EPA shies away from attaching serious consequences to the results of an annual or even a quarterly grab
sample of stormwater. At the same time, however, the lack of
real consequences that flow from high pollutant loads transforms
the already weak program into little more than a paper tiger. At
the end of the day, sources only need to document the steps and
requirements they have taken to comply with the guidelines,
rather than employ rigorous or innovative improvements to the
site that actually succeed in minimizing pollutant runoff in storm
flows.147
Making matters worse, there appears to be very limited
regulatory resources; for example, in Oregon, there is only one
inspector to oversee compliance with the stormwater program.148
141

See id. at 33.
See id.
See, e.g., id. (explaining that sources are obliged to provide general information
on the storm event itself when submitting their sample).
144
See, e.g., id. at 33-34.
145
See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at VIII-1.
146
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3 at 10, 30, 34.
147
See id. at 44.
148 Libby Tucker, Oregon and Washington to Release Tougher Standards for Stormwater Permits, DAILY J. COMMERCE (Portland, Or.), Dec. 12, 2005, at 2 (reporting that
Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality only has “one full-time employee inspecting the 1,500 [stormwater] sites under permit . . . .”); McClure, supra note 111, at B1 (re142
143
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And yet even with considerable regulatory resources dedicated to
stormwater source inspections, it is not clear how well inspectors
could independently assess compliance with the permit requirements. For example, some of the plan’s requirements will specify
“good housekeeping” practices that should take place routinely at
the facility from day-to-day.149 Whether or how well these practices are followed cannot be assessed in a single inspection.
While a particularly non-compliant facility might be apparent
from a brief, one-shot visual inspection, a facility that is mildly
sloppy, or at least has periods during which it is not careful, can
escape detection on one of these pre-announced audits. Facilities
also know best the pollutants they generate and how or whether
those pollutants might make contact with stormwater. Inspectors might be able to notice some of these problems, but because
they do not have the same level of information about the operations of the facility, they can be expected to miss some problems.
A final compliance concern—which goes both to the facility’s
incentives to be in compliance as well as to the realities of enforcement in terms of the probability of being caught in violation—is the seeming impossibility of using citizen suits to enforce
stormwater permit requirements. To the extent that states and
locales do not oversee stormwater permit programs with vigor,
citizens may be the only realistic hope of providing some meaningful enforcement to the program. Citizens have, in fact, sued
facilities for unpermitted stormwater discharges:150 this is a
straightforward process because citizens need only verify that the
facility is covered and lacks a permit.151 Overseeing facility compliance with stormwater permit requirements is a different story,
however, and citizens are stymied at this stage of ensuring facility compliance. Citizens can access a facility’s pollution prevention plan, but only if they request the plan from the facility in
writing.152 Moreover, the facility is given the authority to make a
determination—apparently without regulator oversight—of
whether the plan contains confidential business information and
thus cannot be disclosed to citizens.153 But, even if the facility
porting that state employees available to inspect stormwater discharges in Washington
are “thin”). But see California EPA, California Water Boards, ENFORCEMENT REPORT,
Feb. 23, 2005, at 11, 13-14, available at
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/legislative/docs/2004/enforcementrpt2004_13385o.pdf (outlining considerable enforcement activity under the stormwater discharge program).
149
See supra Part II.A.2.
150
See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 108, at A1.
151
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
152
See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 25; see also supra note 125 (noting
how citizens do not have a formal opportunity to review the adequacy of facilities’
SWPPPs).
153
Id. at 26.
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sends the plan to the citizens, it will be nearly impossible for
them to independently assess whether the facility is in compliance unless the citizens station telescopes, conduct air surveillance of the site, or are allowed to access the facility’s records of
its own self-inspections.154 Moreover, to the extent that the
stormwater outfalls are on the facility’s property, citizens might
not be able to conduct their own sampling without trespassing.
In any event, and as mentioned above, the permit requirements
are so flexible that an arguably large range of activities with
tremendously variable impacts on water quality are allowed under existing permit requirements. Thus, renting telescopes
would not be worth the trouble because the facility could likely
argue that its small eroding impoundment basin is nevertheless
a functioning basin as that term is specified in the general menu
of BMPs. In most cases, then, the disputes will ultimately devolve to arguments about whether the facility has complied with
the minimum recordkeeping requirements in these settings, the
facility will not only have private information to assist them in
defending their compliance, but may be able to deprive the citizens of standing if they can amend their records after the fact.155
III. REFORM
The federal stormwater NPDES program is a disappointment. Despite its extravagant wrappings, underneath the links,
guidance documents, and studies is a program that is designed in
a way that does not seem cognizant of existing information problems and that could exacerbate the tendency of owners to keep
information to themselves.
Reforming this program requires acknowledging the unique
information constraints that afflict it. Such a reform does not require scrapping the existing program, but would involve designing and implementing controls in ways that confront and overcome some of the existing asymmetries in information.
In this section, three possibilities for reform—some more
promising than others—are considered.
A. The Role of State and Local Governments
Because it requires controls on land use, the EPA’s stormwater discharge program strikes at a target that is traditionally
154

Cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that aerial
surveillance by the government does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
155
Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998) (finding that
the relief sought would not redress losses caused by steel manufacturer’s violations and
therefore, the plaintiff “failed to satisfy redressability requirement for standing”).
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within the province of state and even more likely local government regulation.156 Indeed, it is possible that part of the reason
for the EPA’s loosely structured permit program is its concern
about intruding on the province of state and local governments,
particularly given their superior expertise in regulating land use
practices.
In theory, it is perfectly plausible that some state and local
governments will step into the void and overcome some of the information problems built into the design of the federal stormwater discharge program. If local or state governments required
mandatory monitoring or more rigorous and less ambiguous
BMPs, they would make considerable progress in developing a
more successful stormwater control program. In fact, some
states and locales have instituted programs that take these steps
and began to confront and overcome the problems of asymmetrical and uncertain information more directly. For example, California appears to lead all other states in aggressive stormwater
discharge programs, including implementing greatly expanded
monitoring requirements.157 Municipalities are also blazing new
trails.158 Notably, Stafford, New Jersey uses innovative municipal stormwater systems that filter the runoff before discharging
it back into aquifers.159 Another town in Michigan is developing
cutting-edge techniques for tracking illicit connections into the
municipal stormwater system.160
Despite these bursts of enthusiasm, most state, local governments and business communities have not been receptive to
regulating stormwater discharges; therefore, it is unlikely that
they will take action to repair the EPA’s failing federal pro-

156
See A. Dan Tarlock, Contested Landscapes and Local Voice, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 513, 526 (2000) (discussing the proposition that “water law is an exclusive state
function”).
157 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, FACT SHEET
FOR WATER QUALITY ORDER 99-08-DWQ, NPDES GENERAL PERMIT FOR STORMWATER
STORM WATER DISCHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY (GENERAL
PERMIT): SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 34, available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/
docs/9908_factsheet.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). The States of Washington and Maryland also have aggressive programs. See, e.g., Washington Department of Ecology, Water
Quality Program, Stormwater, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/stormwater/ (last visited May 12, 2006); Maryland Department of the Environment, Maryland’s Stormwater
Management Program, http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/WaterPrograms/Sediment
andStormwater/index.asp (last visited May 12, 2006).
158
See, e.g., Prince George’s County, Maryland, PRD Stormwater Management Details Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.co.pg.md.us/Government/AgencyIndex/
DER/PRD/stormwater_management.asp (last visited May 12, 2006).
159
See Erik Larsen, Stafford Floods Lot to Show off System, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Asbury Park, N.J.), Mar. 6, 2004, at B1.
160
See Dean C. Tuomari & Susan Thompson, Sherlocks of Stormwater, WATER ENV’T
& TECH., May 1, 2005, at 49, available at 2005 WLNR 8150301.
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gram.161 Because they involve some expense, stormwater discharge requirements can increase resident taxes,162 anger businesses,163 and strain already busy regulatory staff.164 The dearth
of scientific evidence connecting stormwater controls with water
quality improvements makes implementation of these programs
seem even less compelling. The president of a builders’ league in
New Jersey quipped that: “[t]here’s no scientific background for
these regulations . . . They seem to be into junk science.”165 In
any event, a fair number of states have already passed “no more
stringent” laws which legislatively preclude them from taking
added actions to improve on the federal stormwater program,
even if they had the will to do so.166 Local and state government
disinterest in stormwater discharge regulation thus helps to explain why there are many stormwater sources out of compliance
with the stormwater discharge permit program, at least in the
few states that have gone on record.167
Interestingly, for at least some of the states and localities
that have taken leadership roles in repairing the federal stormwater program, there appears to be particularly compelling water
quality benefits that accrue to them that might not be available
to other states or locales. Innovations in recharging municipal
stormwater takes place in a New Jersey town that is adjacent to
a recreational bay that was suffering from poor water quality.168
“Sewer sleuths” traced illicit connections in a town that was attempting to transform its adjacent, degraded river into a water
body fit for fishing and swimming.169 California and cities like
161
See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 148, at 2 (quoting Oregon agency staff member as
saying: “‘Compared to other states, we’re doing pretty well as far as the requirements. No
other states outside of Washington and California have monitoring in their construction
permits at all . . . .’”); Stormwater Woes Solutions Sought, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER (Asbury Park, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2005, at A16 (describing lack of enthusiasm for the stormwater
program in New Jersey); SD Stormwater Runoff Rules Survive Building Industry Test,
CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Jan. 1, 2005, at 12 (describing unsuccessful lawsuit brought by regulated parties against the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board for their vigorous stormwater program that exceeds the federal floor)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
162 See, e.g., Jacinthia Jones, City To Assess Runoff Fee In July, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, Tn.), Dec. 11, 2005, at B1.
163
See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 161, at 12.
164
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
165
See, e.g., Thomas Barlas, New Stormwater Rules to Protect State Streams,
McGreevey Promises, PRESS (Atlantic City, N.J.), Jan. 6, 2004, at A8.
166
See generally Andrew Hecht, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
105 (2004) (discussing these “no more stringent” laws).
167
See Richardson, supra note 108, at A10; McClure, supra note 111, at B4.
168
See Jacques Cousteau National Estuarine Research Reserve, Coastal Resources
Toolkit: Stormwater Management, 2. Case Study: Stafford Township, NJ, http://www.
jcnerr.org/coastal_training/toolkit/storm/case-study.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
169
See Tuomari & Thompson, supra note 160, at 49–50.
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San Diego, Newport Beach, and Santa Monica enjoy a great deal
of tourism from their ocean frontage, making their extra efforts
to control water quality largely selfish. The energies dedicated to
the stormwater program by state and local governments in the
aggregate, in fact, might actually be loosely correlated with localized rewards from cleaner water quality. When a state or locality
does not derive direct or immediate benefits from investing resources in stormwater discharge reduction, they might be less inclined to implement an innovative stormwater program.
Despite the substantial role they could play in correcting the
federal program’s insensitivity to the science constraints, many
states and locales do not appear to be eager to implement the
stormwater discharge programs, much less make it more stringent and enforceable. This lack of enthusiasm also makes sense
in rational choice terms. Stormwater discharge regulation is
costly and politically unpopular.170 If the benefits of stormwater
controls are not going to materialize in waters close to or of value
to the urban area, then the costs of the program from locality’s
standpoint are likely to outweigh its benefits. In fact, in some
cases an upstream town’s efforts might be perceived as benefiting
only downstream neighbors who might attract away its taxpayers with lower stormwater regulation and/or a higher water quality.171
What is not clear is the extent to which the current federal
program actually serves as a roadblock to innovative approaches
at the state or local level. The elaborate paper requirements for
stormwater discharge permits create an infrastructure that may
ultimately displace—both in terms of effort and framing the
problem—other approaches to stormwater discharge control. Indeed, the tendency of an elaborate but failed federal program to
effectively preempt state innovation is a familiar problem with
the Clean Water Act: it has also been raised as a problem with
the EPA’s obsessively methodological TMDL program.172
Moreover, by developing such a poor federal template for
stormwater discharge regulation, the EPA may also be setting up
those governments that do attempt to innovate for untoward political pressure. San Diego has already been singled out by its
business community who argued that the county’s more rigorous
170
See, e.g., June F. Harrigan-Lum & Arnold L. Lum, Hawaii’s TMDL Program: Legal Requirements and Environmental Realities, 15 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 12, 61 (2000).
171
But see SUZANNE DALLMAN & THOMAS PIECHOTA, LOS ANGELES & SAN GABRIEL
RIVERS WATERSHED COUNCIL, STORM WATER: ASSET NOT LIABILITY (1999), available at
http://www.lasgrwc.org/publications/Stormwater.pdf (making the case that there can be
immediate benefits to some communities in removing pollutants from stormwater).
172
See id. at 61–62.
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implementation of the stormwater discharge permit program violated federal law because it exceeded federal standards.173 Although they lost their lawsuit against the County of San Diego,174
undoubtedly these businesses’ discontent continues in the form of
political pressure on elected officials and others responsible for
implementing the stormwater program. Finally, it is possible
that the extensive paper requirements give the federal program
the illusion of providing a comprehensive solution to stormwater
runoff problems. This regulatory mirage carries the potential to
mislead the public and reduce the urgency of introducing more
effective approaches to stormwater discharge controls.
B.

Mandatory, Systematic Monitoring

Given the strong asymmetries in information that the regulated facilities enjoy under the stormwater regulatory program, a
rigorous water quality monitoring system that assesses the facilities’ real progress in reducing stormwater discharges would be
enormously beneficial, if not vital, to make the program work.175
As described in Part II, the current federal stormwater program
not only fails to require meaningful monitoring, but may actually
provide disincentives for sources to conduct rigorous monitoring
on their own.
Holding stormwater sources accountable for the objective results of their stormwater control efforts evidenced in monitoring
results, rather than their largely unenforceable plans, should begin to overcome at least some of the problems of asymmetric information. Indeed, monitoring may provide the only way to overcome these information asymmetries. The monitoring approach
also mimics the successful approach taken in the traditional
NPDES program governing industrial effluent. Finally, monitoring could also be used to establish “default goals” that help define
the types of stormwater discharge improvements that must take
place in the future, while leaving it to individual sources to develop the best ways to meet these challenges.176 Conversely, if
monitoring reveals that pollutants in stormwater runoff from a
source or cluster of sources are insignificant, then these sources
might be expected to implement only a basic, visible type of
173

See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 161, at 12.
Id. at 12.
175 See EPA, HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 53 (stating that “documentation and
quantification of pollutant characteristics and effects are critical in developing an urban
runoff pollution prevention and control plan.”).
176
Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully
set at what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each
other or to third parties . . . .”).
174
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structural BMP with no requirements for paperwork or selfinspections.
However, given the added scientific uncertainties that accompany the sampling of runoff, creating a meaningful monitoring system for stormwater discharges will not be easy. The variability of loadings in stormwater produce ample room for missing
“upsets” of pollutants as well as unrepresentative hits of large
concentrations of pollutants that give false positives.177 Unlike
the NPDES industrial effluent program, which can involve the
installation of end-of-the-pipe monitors that take samples at
regular intervals, stormwater discharges occur predominantly
during storm events and these monitors will not be able to sample runoff continuously or even at regular intervals.178 Nevertheless, with careful design, monitoring can provide valuable insight
about water quality loadings from nonpoint sources—and particularly stormwater discharges—and will help isolate the worst
problems in a water body.179
Fortunately, the mistakes made by the current stormwater
discharge systems are instructive in establishing this more comprehensive monitoring system. In contrast to the current federal
stormwater discharge program that defers any monitoring activity to the regulated parties, all monitoring should be done by a
governmental agency, whether it be local, state, or federal. Creating this centralized and unbiased monitoring system provides a
number of benefits. First, it allows a group of experts to develop
a systematic monitoring plan that gets the most information for
its investment. Sampling locations, for example, could shift: as
one contributor is identified and its discharges reduced, the
monitoring could shift to other troubled locales. Second, replacing regulated parties’ unsupervised “visual” samples and sporadic grab samples of stormwater discharge with a sampling plan
developed and implemented by the technical staff of an agency is
bound to improve the reliability of sampling. At least one study
indicates that composite sampling (taking multiple samples over
time) is far superior to grab samples in characterizing stormwater discharges; yet this more expensive and sophisticated monitoring technique is best implemented by a trained team of scientists.180 Major sources of bias and incompetence, which are
177
See supra note 73; see generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4–7 (explaining that pollutant measurements can be highly
variable).
178
See id. at 4-24 to 4-25.
179
See, e.g., EPA, HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 53. See also Haejin Lee & Michael
K. Stenstrom, Utility of Stormwater Monitoring, 77 WATER ENVT. RESEARCH, May/June
2005, at 219.
180
See Lee & Stenstrom, supra note 179, at 225 (advocating a trained team to con-
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especially expected in the difficult job of monitoring runoff, can
also be minimized when technical agency staff conducts the sampling. Finally, economies of scale will reduce the cost of this
sampling since the lab and the person doing the sampling can do
it more efficiently when they do it in “bulk.”
In developing a monitoring program, samples should be
taken of the stormwater discharge as well as the receiving waters.181 Together these different sampling efforts provide a relatively robust view of discharge contributions and a basis for imposing greater controls on some facilities and lesser controls on
others. Due to the residual uncertainties in analyzing the samples—for example, determining the largest sources of pollutant
loadings and what added measures might be necessary—
government regulators and scientists would also need to be employed to conduct a rigorous analysis of the sampling results.
This analysis should then lead to added, government-specified
controls, including requiring the stormwater to be treated if the
loading from one or more stormwater sources continues to be
high. The costs of this government-sponsored sampling and
analysis could be passed off in the price of a stormwater discharge permit.
Comprehensive monitoring would not be a complete replacement for the current NPDES system, but would provide a
vital supplement to ensuring the enforceability of existing BMP
requirements. Because of the variability in runoff, monitoring
will have large sources of error and periodic samples will not be
able to provide a definitive measure of stormwater pollutant
loads.182 Thus, even with a reliable monitoring program, stormwater discharge permittees will still need to go on record that
they are educated about stormwater controls and identify the
controls they have put in place on site to minimize pollution runoff through stormwater. But in contrast to the current system,
the permitees will do so knowing that there is now an external
check on their compliance with BMPs and an incentive to make
them truly effective.
Implementing a full-scale monitoring program in response to
the difficulties involved in overseeing stormwater discharges
would also begin to redress a larger problem that has generally
duct composite sampling of stormwater discharges).
181
See generally STORMWATER MONITORING COALITION, MODEL MONITORING
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, MODEL MONITORING PROGRAM FOR MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM
SEWER SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TECHNICAL REPORT #419 (Aug. 2004), available at ftp://ftp.sccwrp.org/pub/download/PDFs/419_smc_mm.pdf; EPA, THE USE OF BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67.
182
See id. at 4-2.
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plagued the Clean Water Act. In part, because of the NPDES’s
success in circumventing the need for science in setting effluent
standards, there has been less attention paid to water quality
monitoring.183 Water quality monitoring is not even technically
required by the Clean Water Act.184 Indeed, if anything, the burdensome features of the federal TMDL program—which apply
when water quality monitoring reveals that the waters are degraded—may provide perverse incentives for states and localities
to remain blissfully ignorant about the state of their waters.185
Learning that a water body is polluted only increases conflicts
between the environmentally-minded public and regulated parties—conflicts that elected officials are likely to dodge. Inept and
nonexistent monitoring provides the recipe for keeping these
bothersome water quality problems off the political radar.
Given the continued apathy in water quality monitoring, the
demand for such a comprehensive monitoring program would
need to be a federal requirement. One clear lesson that emerges
from the thirty-plus years of implementation of the Clean Water
Act is that states and locales will not conduct rigorous water
quality monitoring without prodding.186 Moreover, the uneven
quality of the monitoring that is done suggests that some standard federal prescriptions for monitoring are needed.187 The federal program could also identify the costs of such a monitoring
program and suggest how the costs could be rolled over into permit fees. Indeed, to the extent that permit fees of existing
stormwater sources provide some of the financial support for a
monitoring system, it would make the states and locales more inclined to identify unpermitted sources and bring them into the
system.

183
See, e.g., EPA, EPA 100-R-98-006, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 3 (July 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/faca/facaall.pdf.
184
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000).
185 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000); see also Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After
Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen
Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 395-96, 423-25 (1997) (detailing the ways in which the
TMDL program has failed due to the EPA’s historic disinterest in the program and the
states’ inactivity in implementing its requirements).
186 See, e.g., PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, PEER WHITE
PAPER: MURKY WATERS: OFFICIAL WATER QUALITY REPORTS ARE ALL WET 2 (May 1999)
(concluding in its executive summary that “an unfortunate mix of politics, bureaucratic
inertia and bad science means that conflicting, erroneous and manipulated sets of water
quality data containing little accurate information on the actual condition of the nation’s
rivers and streams are routinely reported by States and dutifully compiled by EPA for
presentation to Congress and the public.”).
187
Id. at 2–3.
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Revitalizing Multi-media Regulation

When considering stormwater discharge program reform, it
is easy to be swept away by the narrow, bureaucratic framing of
the problem that targets regulation only of those with immediate
control over the problematic pollutants, namely the owners or
users of the land or storm drains. This framing is justified and
appropriate for regulatory purposes, but it is not the only framing possible and should not be the sole approach to stormwater
controls or water quality improvements.
Stepping back, it is evident that several of the major “problem” sources of pollutants in stormwater runoff are widespread
products and activities, some of which can be regulated further
upstream at the point of manufacture. Regulating products at
their point of manufacture also has the enormous advantage of
circumventing asymmetrical information problems, as well as the
uncertainties in measuring stormwater sources’ contributions to
runoff pollution. If problematic sources of pollution are eliminated entirely, e.g., by banning them, then at least those sources
of pollution are no longer in need of monitoring or BMPs. Indeed,
such an approach capitalizes on the information that science is
able to provide—namely the types of products and activities that
result in the highest loadings of pollutants nationwide.
One of the most significant products that introduces pollutants through stormwater runoff is the motor vehicle.188 Vehicle
emissions include particulates and gases that ultimately deposit
on the land in the form of highly toxic metals and complex hydrocarbons, like polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).189 Vehicle exhaust accounts for a significant portion of these pollutants that
enter receiving waters in the form of runoff.190
Stormwater pollution alone might not provide an adequate
impetus to ban or substantially regulate the emissions from motor vehicles, but at the very least, it should be another reason to
encourage the development of Low and Zero Emissions Vehicles
(LEVs and ZEVs). Since auto emissions have their greatest
negative impact on the ability of localities to meet Clean Air Act
requirements, there has already been considerable effort dedicated to encourage the development of these LEVs and ZEVs,
particularly in California.191 Yet it appears that water quality
concerns are not currently included in the motivation to develop
188

See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-15 to 4-16.
Id. at 4-15 to 4-16.
190
Id.
191
See, e.g., State of California Air Resources Board, Fact Sheet: 2003 Zero Emission
Vehicle Program Changes, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/
2003zevchanges.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
189
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this LEV and ZEV technology.192 If water quality concerns were
better publicized, they might provide even more momentum to
encourage the development of these vehicles.193 Beyond subsidizing the development and mass marketing of these vehicles, the
federal government could encourage urban areas to develop incentives for ZEV use in order to reduce stormwater pollutants. It
is too early to sketch out what these incentive programs might
look like. For example, an incentive program may provide
greater federal subsidization of municipal sewage treatment
plants with greater ZEV use in the urban corridor or reduced water quality monitoring requirements for municipalities with
greater ZEV fleets. But the link between changing over to LEVs
and ZEVs and reduced pollutant loadings is sufficiently powerful194 that it could be included in a rigorous stormwater discharge
program.
Other products that are repeat contributors to stormwater
discharges could also be controlled at the manufacturing stage,
most likely through the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).195
Asphalt sealants, for example, can account for some of the toxins
in stormwater runoff: the discovery of the demise of an endangered species in Barton Springs in Austin, Texas was ultimately
linked to a toxin released from the sealant applied to an asphalt
parking lot uphill from the Springs.196 Currently there is effectively no meaningful regulatory oversight of these types of products that leach dangerous toxins into bodies of water. Under the
TSCA, the EPA generally treats all products the same and does
little multi-media analysis to target products that pose particularly significant national risks for air or water.197 There is nothing precluding the EPA from developing this type of rigor in its
implementation of TSCA. The EPA’s authority to prioritize and
target products that increase pollutants in runoff—both for
added testing and regulation—is clear from the broad language

192
There is some forward momentum in the State of California to examine these airwater connections, however. See, e.g., California Environmental Protection Agency, State
Water Resources Control Board, Workshop—Atmospheric Deposition and Water Quality
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/workshops/atmospheric.html.
193
See generally California ZEV Alliance, Californians Support Zero-Emission Vehicle Program 2 to 1 ZEV Alliance Urges CARB to Hold Firm on ZEV Program,
http://www.electrifyingtimes.com/ZEV.html (noticing the disparate benefits of ZeroEmission Vehicle Programs in California) (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
194
See California ZEV Alliance, supra note 193.
195
See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)
(2000).
196
See Kevin Carmody, City Didn’t Provide All Data Needed to Assess Pool Risks,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 2003, at A1, A7.
197
See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 268–69 (1991).
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of the statute.198
As a result, a second multi-media initiative would be for the
EPA to identify the types of products—like asphalt sealants—
that produce widespread sources of dangerous toxins that leach
into waters either as nonpoint pollution or through stormwater
discharges—and investigate and potentially regulate them at the
site of manufacture. The EPA could require the manufacturers
to test these products in terms of their leaching potential and require warnings on the products that alert buyers or even local or
state officials as to their elevated toxicity, particularly relative to
other types of asphalt sealants that prove less toxic. States or locales, in turn, might decide to ban or tax the more toxic products.
IV. CONCLUSION
Proper design of an environmental regulatory system requires attention to the entrenched limitations in scientific and
technical information that are needed to define and redress the
problem. Information asymmetries can also be especially problematic in developing enforceable regulatory requirements.
Unfortunately, the federal stormwater permit program fails
to take these information constraints into account. Instead, it reflexively maps the regulation of stormwater discharges onto the
NPDES program, which was designed to regulate pollutants in
industrial effluent. Because of the program’s failure to accommodate the new, added uncertainties related to stormwater, the
effort to force-fit stormwater regulation into the existing permit
model runs the risk of transforming a very successful model program for industrial effluent into an entirely unsuccessful program for stormwater runoff.
We can do better. External, comprehensive monitoring of
waters is long overdue, as are more rigorous controls of pervasive
sources of water pollution, like automobile exhaust and asphalt
sealants. If we are to make real, meaningful progress on reducing pollutants from stormwater discharge, these and other innovative programs that identify and work around information constraints are essential.

198

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(A) (2000) (providing the EPA with authority to
mandate added testing if the chemical “may present” a risk or hazard).

